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Consciousness in the 1904/1905 Lectures
Azul Tamina Katz 
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abstract: While it is true that Husserl did not write systematically about aesthetics, 
it is not only possible and legitimate but also necessary to inquire how a Husserlian 
aesthetic consciousness could be understood. A closer consideration of the aesthetics 
that can be gleaned from the passages in which Husserl explicitly refers to artistic expe-
riences shows a limitation of the aesthetic field to figurative art. To widen and enrich the 
aesthetic field beyond the experiences that such an aesthetics would account for, a shift 
of perspective is required. But to allow this change without leaving Husserl’s phenome-
nology, I consider in this article the outcome of analyzing this field of experiences from 
phantasy’s perspective instead of that of image consciousness.
keywords: imagination, phantasy, image consciousness, aesthetics, Husserl
Monotheism of reason & heart, polytheism of imagination and art: 
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—“the oldest systematic programme of german 
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Even today aesthetics is not considered among Edmund Husserl’s main 
interests. It is true, however, that there are many other phenomenological 
approaches to aesthetics among his “heretic” disciples, as Ricoeur (1986, 
156) calls them. I am thinking here especially of Sartre’s L’Imagination 
(1936) and L’imaginaire (1940), Roman Ingarden’s Untersuchungen zur 
Ontologie der Kunst (1962) and Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931), and Mikel 
Dufrenne’s Phénoménologie de l’expérience esthétique (1953). Nevertheless, it 
may be objected that in regard to Husserl’s work in aesthetics, research 
has been, at times, limited or simplified. Though interest in phantasy and 
imagination has increased in the past few years, most of the attention is 
still directed toward the role of eidetic variation in knowledge and, mainly, 
toward Husserl’s descriptions of experiences of pictorial works of art—such 
as the famous passage of Ideas I in which Dürer’s engraving is mentioned. 
So, even in this analysis, aesthetic consciousness seems not to be the main 
concern.
Thus, this article is motivated by the idea that it is not possible that a 
philosophy that inquires, above all, about the relationship between con-
sciousness and the world would have omitted the question of aesthetic 
experience. Although Husserl’s references to art and aesthetics do not 
allow us, quantitatively, to reverse the idea that aesthetics is not to be found 
among his main interests, qualitatively his philosophy motivates this arti-
cle’s main inquiry: How can a phenomenology of aesthetic consciousness 
be founded from a Husserlian point of view? As Husserl writes in his arti-
cle on “phenomenology” for the Encyclopedia Britannica: with phenome-
nology “all rational problems, and thus also those that traditionally are in 
some special sense . . . philosophically significant . . . are first able to obtain 
their genuine formulation and feasible means for their solution” (Hua IX, 
299). I take this to mean that a phenomenological foundation of aesthetics 
not only is feasible but may even be interpreted as a requirement of the 
system itself. Even if this question does not appear explicitly, it would be 
faithful to Husserl’s work to pose the question in order to enable a system-
atic response—a task that may exceed the purposes of the present work.
Having said that, the next section presents some nuclear aspects of 
what I would like to call Husserl’s phenomenology of aesthetic consciousness by 
focusing on volume XXIII of Husserliana, which is dedicated to the experi-
ences of phantasy, image consciousness, and memory. I will show why the 
image consciousness heuristic model is too limited to account for aesthetic 
experiences, and I will argue, in contrast, that another heuristic model, that 
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of phantasy, appears more appropriate to account for more complex and 
diverse aesthetic phenomena.
1. The Aesthetic Consciousness According to Husserl
There are three possible directions in which to start looking for a Husserlian 
aesthetic: (1) One can inquire about the work of art, which would lead to an 
ontological approach; (2) one could take the artist-genius-creator’s point of 
view, resulting in a psychological approach to the subject; or (3) one could 
address the receiver or spectator, to get a phenomenology of aesthetic experi-
ence. For several reasons this third direction promises to be a better starting 
point. On the one hand, it is more faithful to the sense that the discipline 
of aesthetics had during its rise with Baumgarten and with Kant’s Critique 
of Judgment, that is, as a branch of gnoseology. On the other hand, to favor 
the spectator’s approach to the aesthetic problem means also to be faithful 
to the key issue of Husserl’s philosophy, which is to say, the problem of the 
correlation between consciousness and the world.1 While an ontology of the 
artwork would lead us to an objectification of the problem, and a psychology 
of artistic creation would only give us a subjective answer to the problem, an 
inquiry into reception, I believe, incorporates both dimensions.
If we take phenomenology to be our method, we should take imagi-
nation to be our subject. Since imagination is usually considered to play 
a main part in the aesthetic field, it is reasonable to claim that it is so in 
Husserl’s analysis as well. But, then, I have to ask which of the experi-
ences studied by Husserl corresponds to the historical aesthetic concept 
of “imagination”: Is it image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) or phantasy 
(Phantasie)? Or is it both image consciousness and phantasy as two modes 
of one and the same imagination (Imagination or Einbildungskraft)?
2. Imagination, Image Consciousness, and Phantasy in Husserl’s 
Transcendental Phenomenology
It is not clear how to determine which kind of consciousness of those 
studied by Husserl best corresponds to the imagination concept, because 
Husserl, too, is an heir to a common Western oversight. This is the con-
flation of the concepts of “imagination” and “phantasy.” But it should be 
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remembered that from an etymological standpoint, the word imagination 
seems to express an almost purely visual sense, since it contains the root 
imago—that is, image. In comparison, the Greek word φαντασία, from 
which the Latin words phantasia and imaginatio come, refers not only to 
visual appearances but also to appearances that differ from perceptive 
senses, such as mystic or oneiric experiences.2
However, in Ideas I imagination and phantasy are decidedly distinct. 
On the one hand, phantasy is considered a simple presentification, an inac-
tual form of consciousness, a form that gives the object itself, though not in 
the flesh. On the other hand, image consciousness is considered a complex 
type of presentification, giving its objects in a mediate way, by similarity, as 
in pictures, statues, or photographs. Now, is the aesthetic experience a case 
of phantasy or a case of image consciousness?
If we look at §70 of Ideas I, we find hints that suggest that art belongs in 
the domain of phantasy. The most famous of these passages concludes that 
thanks to the freedom of phantasy, “if one is fond of paradoxical phrases, 
one can actually say . . . in strict truth, that ‘feigning’ [Fiktion] makes up 
the vital element of phenomenology as of every other eidetic science” (Hua III/1, 
160). But the paradox is that the example of aesthetic experience given by 
Husserl in §111 is that of Dürer’s engraving The Knight, Death, and the Devil. 
With this example, Husserl shows how image consciousness works, not 
phantasy (Hua III/1, 260–62).
3. Aesthetic Consciousness in the Prototranscendental 
1904/1905 Lectures
It is to be expected that an inquiry into the differences between image con-
sciousness and phantasy will enable us to retrace where the crystallization 
of aesthetics as a case of image consciousness began. In this respect, vol-
ume XXIII of Husserliana, entitled Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. 
Zur Phänomenologie der Anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem 
Nachlass (1898–1925), is of great relevance, especially its first text, Phantasie 
und Bildbewusstsein. This corresponds to the third part of the lectures, Über 
die Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und der Erkenntnistheorie, of which 
the most famous part is the fourth and last one: On the Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness of Internal Time.3
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Thereupon, in this third part of the 1904/5 lectures, Phantasie und 
Bildbewusstsein, Husserl has two main aims. The first is to establish the 
differences between perception and everything that is not perception: “We 
have been occupying ourselves up to this point with the phenomenology of 
perception. We cannot attempt to carry out a phenomenology of perception 
in a fully adequate way and complete it on its own account without taking 
into consideration the phenomena closely related to perception. By taking 
these phenomena into consideration in the analyses to which we now turn, 
what we have learned thus far will be freshly illuminated, supplemented, 
and enriched. Our immediate aim is the phenomenology of phantasy” (Hua 
XXIII, 1). The second goal is to differentiate between types of presentifica-
tions. As a result, by the end of the lectures on phantasy and image con-
sciousness, we find an outline of the experience scheme of Ideas I.
If we stay with the first aim, that is, to differentiate perception from 
nonperceptive consciousness, then the so-called unitary or synthetic point 
of view of imagination prevails (chapters 1 to 4 of the lectures). This is 
because, in contrast with perception, both image consciousness and phan-
tasy represent or bring to presence something that is not present to the 
eyes or in the flesh. But as the differences between phantasy and image 
consciousness become more and more established—that is, when Husserl 
goes on to develop the second goal—these two modes of consciousness are 
revealed to be irreducible to one another. Thus, at the end, the discrimina-
tive point of view of imagination prevails (chapters 4 to 9 of the lectures).
The first interpretation of how the relation among phantasy, image 
consciousness, and imagination should be understood—the synthetic inter-
pretation, as Dubosson (2004) calls it—is held, for instance, by Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Paul Ricoeur, and Maria Manuela Saraiva, all of whom did not have 
access to the lectures taken into consideration here.4 But the other inter-
pretation, the discriminative one, is relevant because, contrary to the idea 
that it appears for the first time in Ideas I, Husserl already considers image 
consciousness and phantasy to be irreducible to one another in these pre- or 
prototranscendental lectures.5
Having said that, we can no longer understand aesthetic conscious-
ness as linked to imagination in general. We must then ask: Does the aes-
thetic inquiry belong in the field of image consciousness or to phantasy’s 
field? And regardless of Husserl’s answer, what would be the advantages 
and disadvantages of thinking aesthetics from each perspective? To answer 
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these questions, I will first summarize the main features of both types of 
 consciousness in question, as Husserl describes them.
4. Differences Between Image Consciousness and Phantasy 
and Their Consequences for Aesthetics
Until around 1909 Husserl had two models to account for the consti-
tution of experience: the Bildtheorie and the Repräsentationstheorie. The 
Bildtheorie (or image theory) ended up being discarded because of the prej-
udice of presence, as Brough argues in his introduction to volume XXIII of 
Husserliana; such prejudice refers to the idea that for an image to become 
conscious, it has to have some sort of existence or reality in the mind or 
outside of it, an idea that Husserl considers an inadmissible psychological 
prejudice. The second, the Schematic theory or the theory of representa-
tion, was also discarded around 1909 for the analyses of presentifications, 
but Husserl keeps it to account for presentation in Ideas I, where it appears 
as the difference between hýle and morphé. However, by the time of the win-
ter semester of 1904/5, Husserl still describes types of consciousness with 
the Schematic theory, which considers objectifying acts in general as acts of 
apprehension or interpretative acts. Therefore, it must be asked how image 
consciousness and phantasy differ from each other from this theory’s point 
of view. The well-known and aforementioned answer is that phantasy rep-
resents immediately and image consciousness achieves representation in a 
mediate way, that is, through a representative image of the represented or 
intended subject. But this is something Husserl came up with at the end 
of these lectures after several attempts—related to the primacy of each of 
the two main goals mentioned above—to classify these presentifications 
according to their essential phenomenological features.
Thus, the six main features of image consciousness that Husserl finds 
may be summarized as follows. First, image consciousness is an act with 
a three-dimensional structure, constituted by three “overlapping” acts and/
or images: a physical image (the perceptive materiality), an image object 
(the image that arises), and an image subject (the intended or represented 
subject in the image).6 Second, image consciousness is dependent upon per-
ception and physical reality. This is because, to get an image, I need to 
“borrow” perception’s sensuous content and to reinterpret that content as 
something else, that is, as the absent subject I am bringing to a new kind 
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of presence (the kind of presence of an image). So, to reapprehend that 
 sensuous  content, it is necessary (and, then, involuntary and spontaneous) 
to neutralize the first act, that is, to neutralize the perception from which 
the content is being taken. But, though neutralized, this remains as the 
physical materiality of the work of art, to which I can turn my attention: 
the suspension of silver halides on gelatin in a photograph, the canvas 
of a painting, the marble of a statue, and so on. And this, too, explains 
why Husserl sometimes refers to image consciousness as physical imagi-
nation. Consequently, third, image consciousness is an act with a figurative 
function: it must point toward something else that is not present, that is, 
the image subject. Fourth, this figurative function is achieved by means 
of an immanent similarity among the three different dimensions involved 
(unlike symbolic consciousness, which points to a transcendent direction, 
as in the case of writing or that of a flag that represents a country). Husserl 
gives the example of a child’s photograph, whose image “on the whole 
does indeed resemble the child,” but “it is not the child itself, but his pho-
tographic image” (Hua XXIII, 20).
But the main key to understanding image consciousness is its neces-
sary failure (Hua XXIII, 20), for if representation were perfect and abso-
lute, then we would not be able to distinguish the photographed child 
from the child in the photograph. On the contrary, if representation did 
not have any similarity with what is represented, then we would not reach 
a clear consciousness of an image either. It is then a question of fine bal-
ance: On the one hand, an absolute coincidence would fall into illusion—
sometimes even hallucination—as in the wax figurines or the mannequin 
mentioned by Husserl (Hua XXIII, §19) or as is the case in Bioy Casare’s 
Morel’s Invention.7 On the other hand, if the semblance were too weak, 
then we would not have enough sensuous elements for any image appre-
hension to succeed, as pointed out by Sartre in L’imaginaire (1948) regard-
ing a too-lightly drawn pencil portrait that barely suggests similarity with 
what it represents. Husserl’s description of the act of image conscious-
ness corresponds, then, to a usual phenomenological practice: what is 
described is the purest act of a kind, but there are still some gradual, pos-
sible marginal experiences between the core act of a kind of conscious-
ness and its fading into other kinds of acts. Fifth, that is why, in order 
to represent what the image object is pointing at, image consciousness 
needs to conflict with the actual present, that is, I must be aware that what 
is represented is not what I have physically in front of me. Furthermore, 
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this conflict should be understood not only in a spatial way but also as a 
temporal conflict:
The image object, however, . . . bears within itself the characteristic of 
unreality, of conflict with the actual present. . . . So we have appearance 
here, sensuous intuition and objectification, but in conflict with an 
experienced present. We have the appearance of a not now in the 
now. “In the now,” insofar as the image object appears in the midst of 
perceptual reality and claims, as it were, to have no objective reality 
in its midst. “In the now” also insofar as the image-apprehending is 
something temporally now. Yet, on the other hand, a “not now” insofar 
as the conflict makes the image object into a nullity that does indeed 
appear but is nothing, and that may serve only to exhibit something 
existing. (Hua XXIII, 51)
So finally, sixth, the ontological status of the image object is, as Husserl 
points out, a quasi existence, a nonexistence, simply nothing: “[An] image 
object truly does not exist, which means not only that it has no existence 
outside my consciousness, but also that it has no existence inside my con-
sciousness; it has no existence at all” (Hua XXIII, 23).
In contrast, phantasy is simple. It does not depend on a physical moti-
vation, and that is why this kind of presentification’s main features are free-
dom, independence, a certain arbitrariness, and, thus, also creativity. These 
features make phantasy an act of great importance not specifically for aes-
thetics, according to Husserl, but for eidetic phenomenology, that is, for the 
Imaginative variation (which is a process actually led by Phantasie).
Besides its independence from perception, phantasy is distinguished 
from both image consciousness and perception in that its underlying sen-
suous materiality is of a different kind: it is not sensation but phantasm. 
Against Brentano, Husserl claims that, in addition to the differences 
between types of acts, the differences at the content level must be kept in 
the analysis in spite of how complex, challenging, and disappointing such 
research may be.8 Hence, one must pay special attention when dealing 
with phantasy. Its freedom very quickly turns phantasy into an ungrasp-
able phenomenon that slips away from even the sharpest phenomeno-
logical regard. But the difficulties of this theory (reminiscent of Kant’s 
first Critique) in accounting for presentifications have less to do with the 
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apprehension acts than with the contents that are being interpreted. This 
is because it is not clear whether the nonactual feature of presentifica-
tions should come out of the act itself—if the act is present, where does 
it get a nonpresent power?—or whether it should belong to the content 
itself. The latter possibility gave Husserl further trouble, since consider-
ing presentification contents as  sensuous phantasmata again raises the 
difficult question of where these phantasmata get their nonactual feature 
from. This is probably one of the main reasons why Husserl abandoned 
the Schematic theory.
5. Limits and Insufficiencies of Husserlian Aesthetic 
Consciousness as a Case of Immanent Physical Imagination
In §17 of Phantasie und Bildbewusstsein, aesthetic consciousness, aesthetic 
contemplation, and aesthetic creation are explicitly considered from the 
perspective of the image consciousness heuristic model. More specifically, 
aesthetic consciousness is considered as a case of immanent physical imagi-
nation, which is one way of referring to image consciousness as opposed to 
the transcendent physical imagination (symbolic consciousness): “Only the 
consciousness that belongs to the immanent imagination plays a role in the 
aesthetic contemplation of an image” (Hua XXIII, 39).
However, it cannot be said that there is absolute identity between 
immanent image consciousness and aesthetic consciousness. We may 
say that all aesthetic consciousness is, or involves, image consciousness, 
but not all image consciousness implies an aesthetic experience. First, 
this is because image consciousness, experienced as aesthetic contem-
plation of a picture, must involve a change in attitude—a shift of atten-
tion—from the subject represented to the image object that represents 
the intended subject. Second, image consciousness and aesthetic con-
sciousness should not be equated, because aesthetic contemplation also 
involves pleasure, which is not a condition for all image consciousness 
to occur. In appendix VI to §17 of Phantasie und Bildbewusstsein, we can 
find a fine description of these two aesthetic conditions: pleasure and a 
particular disinterested attitude that Husserl seems to assume for aes-
thetics. An affinity with Kant’s aesthetics cannot be overlooked in this 
passage, even if researchers seem to agree that Husserl did not read 
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Kant’s Critique of Judgment: “In the aesthetic attitude . . . I am not in a 
theoretical attitude in which I am directed toward ‘being’ (true being), 
perhaps in order to describe it, or even, in a practical attitude, to trans-
form it, to claim it as my own, to desire it, to take delight in it as some-
thing actual. The pleasure here [in the aesthetic attitude] leaves existence 
out of play and is essentially determined by the modes of appearance” 
(Hua XXIII, 168 n. 1).
If we believe that Husserl’s aesthetics must be understood in such 
a way that it is restricted to his explicit examples, then we must assume 
that Husserl takes art to be almost exclusively figurative, in the sense that 
images arising in contemplation must always point to something beyond 
themselves, something real in some way, something meaningful. This may 
be due to various reasons that are not entirely relevant here (his disinter-
est in aesthetics and an inattentive assumption of the image-rooted word 
for “fine arts” in German, Bildendekunst, may be some of these reasons). 
Still, it is problematic if we can only deduce a figurative aesthetic from 
the image consciousness model; this would suggest that art can only be 
visual and mimetic—a kind of art that, through imitation, becomes merely 
technical and loses the possibility to be as creative and productive as it can. 
For what should be said of music, live performances, abstract art, indefi-
nite forms, or even experiences that are not immediately related to outer 
stimuli? Such an aesthetic would be restrictive not only from the receiver’s 
point of view but for creation as well.9 Hence, while Husserl’s idea of art 
appears to be a classic, idealistic, Platonic one, I believe that it is possible to 
extend the sphere of aesthetic experiences in two main directions drawing 
from Husserl’s work: first, toward experiences that not only are visual but 
draw from the other senses as well and, second, toward experiences not 
directly attached to or dependent upon perception, such as ecstatic, oneiric, 
dreamlike, and phantasmatic experiences10—that is, toward experiences 
that reflect the other meanings of φαντασία left aside by the Latin tradition 
and thereafter.
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to suggest that it is possible to achieve the enrich-
ment and widening of the aesthetic field, sought above, and thus a more 
appropriate foundation of aesthetics, by taking up phantasy’s heuristic 
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model. Moreover, image consciousness may be understood as a complex 
kind of consciousness constituted by two interwoven apprehensions: one 
of perception and another of phantasy. In this case, phantasy’s freedom 
would be its main contribution to aesthetics. As such, it not only would 
be essential to image consciousness experiences but would allow other 
experiences to arise regardless of whether a perceptive apprehension has 
taken place. Nevertheless, further consideration must be given to the idea 
that phantasy’s freedom may simultaneously be the poison due to which 
Husserl did not consider this heuristic model in the first place. It is even 
possible that Husserl favored the model of image consciousness because 
it provides more evident and clear cases for phenomenological reflective 
analysis—in contrast to those resulting from the extremely fluctuating 
and highly unstable phantasy. In fact, Husserl discovered this fluctuating, 
vague, constantly changing feature as early as 1898, when he referred to 
this feature of phantasy as Proteusartig.11 But this marginal characteristic of 
phantasy—upon which, I believe, an aesthetic could begin to be founded—
should not deter us from the phenomenological task of building a richer 
and broader aesthetic, one that may even encompass image consciousness 
and other presentifications. Most of all, this calls for a new field of research: 
the field of the temporal constitution of experience in general and of mar-
ginal experiences in particular.
notes
1. See Walton 1993.
2. See Marcos and Díaz 2009.
3. This is not the place to develop the relationship between the different parts 
of these lectures and the fact that the analysis of phantasy concludes with one of 
Husserl’s most serious remarks on the temporality of consciousness, but I find 
this topic of great interest, and it is one of the key points of my present research.
4. Saraiva suggests that there is a generic imagination (Bildvorstellung or 
Imagination) that should be divided into two subtypes according to the classic 
distinction between mental and physical images. Thus, she (1970, 21–22) argues 
that Husserl was the first to absorb these two species of images.
5. In his work L’imagination légitimée, Dubosson argues that the distinction of 
imagination into two forms, Phantasie and Bildbewusstsein, is what has progressively 
legitimized Imagination—a legitimacy that crystallizes in Ideas I. That means 
that these lectures serve as a precedent for imagination rising as the “canonical 
way of intentional consciousness,” which, for Dubosson (2004, 10), means to be 
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objectifying, a title that describes only three kinds of acts: perception, imagination, 
and meaning.
6. See Hua XXIII, §9.
7. “Reality and semblance playing hide-and-seek with each other, as it were—is 
the most extreme antithesis to aesthetic pleasure” (Hua XXIII, 44).
8. See Hua XXIII, §§46–48.
9. We can verify these limitations. For example, in appendix IX to §17, §25, and 
chapter 6 of Phantasie und Bildbewusstsein, in order to maintain the validity of the 
image consciousness model for aesthetics, Husserl argues that in a Beethoven 
sonata there would be an original Beethoven sonata that serves as the ideal against 
which the listener compares particular performances. Different interpretations by 
different musicians should, then, be taken only as degraded copies of the sonata 
meant by Beethoven (although it is not clear how we have access to this ideal).
10. To account for the latter, a phenomenology of pleasure in general, and a 
phenomenology of aesthetic pleasure in particular, should be elaborated.
11. See Hua XXIII, §29.
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